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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Korten, Perlas and Shiva argue that Global civil society emerged as a major social force 
in the final decade of the Second Millennium to resist an assault on life and democracy 
by the institutions of corporate globalization.  ‗Initially, the resistance centered on the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) as the most visible and powerful of the institutional instruments advancing the 
neo-liberal policy agenda of deregulation, the elimination of economic borders and social 
safety nets, and the privatization of common property assets. Subsequently, global civil 
society directed attention to global corporations and financial markets‘ (Korten, Perlas 
and Shiva, 2004).  The question that often arises is what is the relationship between neo-
liberalism and globalisation, why are the two always jointly and equally condemned by 
the global civil society?  Karl Muller argues that there are three dogmas of neo-
liberalism: ―Deregulation, competition and cost cutting, plus in addition the destruction 
of a state which is focused on the common good, and the destruction of its public 
functions; replaced by a focus on profit in all fields of life‖ (Muller, 2007, pg 1).  
Globalisation on the other hand facilitates this by destroying the economic boarders thus 
presenting economic vulnerabilities in the world developing economies.   
 
Globalisation is the growing interconnectedness in political, social, cultural and 
economical spheres.  The interstate connection that globalisation has created allows easy 
flow of information, free flow of goods and services and import and exportation of 
human resources amongst many.  Furthermore ‗Global capital has made claims on 
national states, which in their turn have responded by producing new forms of legality 
that negotiate between national sovereignty and transnational corporate economic actors‘ 
(Tzaliki, 2003).  These legalities are primarily facilitated and administered by two main 
international institutions, the International Monetary Fund, the lender of last resort and 
the World Bank, initially called the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, concentrated on repairing economies ravaged by war.  Developing 
countries are often compelled to make drastic reforms in their social spending and 
economics.  Stringent aid conditionalities are often suggested by these institutions to the 
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developing communities e.g. to remove protective barriers to free trade such as the 
protective tariffs, import quotas, non -tariff barriers and exports subsidies.  They argue 
that these reduce the wealth of nations-states and they prevent the free flow of goods and 
services hence impeding the repayment of debts by the developing states.  Developing 
nations have been arguing in vain that these protective measures are important because 
they protect their economies from economic exploitation i.e. prevent the influx of 
subsidized goods from the developed economies, especially agricultural goods which 
affect the prices of goods in developing economies, eventually leading to closure of 
factories.   
 
However one cannot give a blanket condemnation to globalisation.  Just as the corporate 
and political elites are reaching across national borders to further their agendas, people at 
the grassroots are connecting their struggles around the world to impose their needs and 
interests on the global economy.  Globalisation from above is generating a worldwide 
movement of resistance (Brecher, Castello and Smith, 200, pg10).  Cyberactivism, for an 
example, has become the primary means to provide social movements with the tools of 
information and technology to organize, while also serving as a conduit to mobilize and 
coordinate opinions and action (as in the case of the 1999 Seattle anti-WTO movement 
and related anti-globalization protests) (Tzaliki, 2003).  The use of internet, what Tzaliki 
calls the ‗electronic citizenship‘ or ‗cyberactivism‘ is the product of globalisation and it 
has been very useful in the struggle against global economic exploitation of the poor.  
The global North, continue to lobby on behalf of the poverty stricken Global South using 
these new means of mobilisation i.e. internet, television, mobile phones etc.  
Globalisation of social struggles promotes the agenda of the Global South at different 
platforms internationally.  Kaldor, Anheier and Glasius argue that there are no absolute 
rejecters of globalisation or supporters of globalisation, indeed we should not absolutely 
reject globalisation.  They argue that we need globalisation reformers, these are the 
people usually identified as making up ‗Global Civil Society‘. They support 
interconnectedness and the construction of global governance as a way of benefiting the 
many rather than the few. They support the extension of international law, especially 
relating to human rights, for example, but may favour constraints on the movement of 
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capital‘ ( Kaldor, Anheier and Glasius, 2004, pg 2).  Many global civil organisations 
belong to this category, those who support globalisation and condemn economic 
globalisation, however this is not clearly stated at different platforms where anti-
globalisation/anti neo-liberalism demonstrations take place. 
 
Globalisation removes all limits and necessary economic protection which paves the way 
for neo-liberalism, a system which encourages minimal interference by the government in 
the economy in order to promote economical development.  The policy recommendations 
by the developed nations and World Financial Institutions known as the Washington 
Consensus suggested a plethora of global economic policies, which have since been 
interpreted as neo-liberal.  Washington Consensus is a term which was originally coined 
by John Williamson in 1987-1988.  Washington Consensus refers to economic policies 
adopted by Washington based institutions, IMF, World bank and US Treasurer, as key to 
the development of the developing economies.  The Washington Consensus 
recommended: Making the private sector the primary engine of economic growth, 
maintaining a low rate of inflation and price stability, shrinking the size of state 
bureaucracy, maintaining a balanced budget, elimination and lowering tariffs on imported 
goods, removing restrictions on foreign investment, getting rid of quotas and domestic 
monopolies, increasing exports, privatizing state-owned industries, deregulating capital 
markets, making its currency convertible and opening industries, stock bond markets to 
direct foreign ownership and investment (Stephan, Power, Harvey and Fonseca, 2006, 
pg228).  Many argue that the problems with these economic policy recommendations is 
that they do not take into consideration different economic challenges faced by different 
countries, they are one size fit all economic policy recommendation, a Golden Straight 
Jacket according to Thomas Friedman.  Joseph Stiglitz former chief economist of the 
World Bank blames the market fundamentalism that endorses the view that a free market 
solves all problems flawlessly.  His argument is that one size fits all economic policies 
damage rather than help countries with unique financial governmental and social 
institutions (Stiglitz, 2003, pg27).  
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Many argue therefore that in order to appease the international game board, attract 
international finance and acceptance into the global economy South Africa adopted 
Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR).  GEAR was an unvarnished free-
market program directly in line with the neo-liberal agenda, or what is known as the 
Washington Consensus (Sparks, 2003, pg193).  GEAR recommended moving towards a 
liberal policy of open markets, a balanced budget and privatisation.  South Africa was 
convinced it had to liberalise in terms of the Washington Consensus in order to attract the 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  GEAR predicted increased FDI flows, a growth rate of 
at least five percent and huge gains in no-farm jobs.  Exactly the opposite occurred, no 
FDI to speak of, low growth and sever job losses (Stephan, et al, 2006, pg 254).  All this 
had serious implications in the South African economy and invited a variety of backlash 
from various quarters of the society.  South Africa has therefore found itself in a 
predicament ‗between globalisation and social democracy‘ (Carmody, 2006, pg 261).  
Although GEAR has been able to drop apartheid international debt, brought down 
inflation between three and six percent and the Reserve Bank dropped the interest rates, it 
has failed to address the question of unemployment and under employment.  Furthermore 
Washington Consensus recommends less government control in economy, in that 
situation unemployment and under employment can never be completely eradicated.  
Furthermore the Washington Consensus recommends that the government shrinks 
government bureaucracy and privatise the state owned industries.  The current socio 
economic imbalances in South Africa indicate the opposite, added to that is that 
privatisation will also add to the high level of unemployment. 
 
The Washington Consensus has as a result invited various forms of backlash from the 
Global Civil Society (GCS).  The Global Civil Society‘s activities are led and directed 
from the Global North to the displeasure of most Global South activists, who continue to 
feel alienated by this arrangement.  Becker argues that ‗the social forum process 
originated in the global south and we‘ve taken our leadership cues from the rest of the 
world‘ (Becker, 2007). The argument that is put forward is that the Global South is the 
bastion of all civil socioeconomic and political struggles and yet the agenda on how to 
address these challenges is dictated by the Global North.  The Global North responded by 
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saying that because of the Global North‘s proximity to the capitals of global oppressions 
i.e. World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), most arrangements and 
activities which dominate the Global Civil Society will have to be inevitably directed by 
and from the Global North.  They cite the success of the Seattle protest which forced the 
cancellation of the WTO meeting in 1999.  The battle of Seattle will, in all probability, be 
seen as a turning point in the history of the Global Civil Society of the 21
st
 century. At 
the last major, international meeting of the millennium, and in a city that, better than any 
other, epitomised 'corporate control', the underdogs took on those who met to plan the 
progress of globalisation, and they won (Alexander, 2001, pg 1).  The political science 
literature and above paragraphs repeatedly refer to the world as Global South and North, 
who are they?  The use of the term ―South‖ refers to developing countries collectively, it 
has been part of the shorthand of international relations since the 1970s.  ‗It rests on the 
fact that all of the world‘s industrially developed countries (with the exception of 
Australia and New Zealand) lie to the north of its developing countries‘(UNDP, 2001, pg 
1).   
 
Although the Global Civil Society has tended to concentrate on struggles against neo-
liberalism and globalisation, they are also concerned about environmental issues, women 
rights, genocide, liberation of Palestine, debt cancellation and many other issues.  Jubilee 
South, for an example, has been in the forefront in the struggle of debt cancellation by the 
developed countries, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  The Global Civil 
Society argues that it is unfair for the poor nations to continue paying exorbitant interest 
on the debts which never benefited the masses but few ruling elite and corrupt 
governments.  Hertz argues against the repayment of apartheid debt by South Africa that 
―When the IMF lent to South Africa in 1976 just months after the Soweto uprising, it 
should have presumed that by doing so it was helping to prop up a regime known to be 
cruelly suppressing dissent and perpetrating crimes against humanity‖ (Hertz, 2004, pg 
201).  Jubilee South has therefore responded to this challenge by organising international 
campaigns to cancel the debt.  These campaigns many argue culminated in the G8 
meeting in Scotland in June 2005 announcing the cancellation of the debt owed to the 
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World Bank, International Monetary Fund and African Development Bank by 18 heavily 
indebted countries. 
 
After the first democratic elections in 1994 most Social Movements (SM) in South Africa 
opted for a non adversarial role against their new democratic government.  This is 
because most Social Movements before 1994 were part of the mass democratic 
movement.  In Africa the trend has been that, once government consolidates power it also 
starts clamping down on dissent e.g. Zimbabwe.  Ronning argues that this is situation is 
because of the potential unforeseeable civil backlashes emanating from an organised 
civic structure.  Secondly donors in developing countries prefer to deal with NGOs rather 
than governments who are seen to be corrupt.  Indeed after 1994 most civics in South 
Africa were moving from ‗being vehicles of protest to development agencies‘ 
(Commonwealth Report, pg56).  However unlike in most African countries were 
competition for donor funding has often created animosity within the civil society, South 
African government wisely dealt with this possibility.  Public funding agencies such as 
the National Development Agency (NDA) were established to direct financial resources 
to the sector, and most importantly government enabled the sub-contracting of 
development services to a number of civil society actors, thereby entrenching the 
collegiate logic of state-civil society relations during the immediate post-apartheid phase 
(Ballard, et al, 2006, pg 2).  The South African government became a ‗wholesale 
fundraiser/recipient‘ internationally and the funds were pumped into the ‗corporatist 
institution‘ NDA in order to facilitate the new role assumed by the civil society in the 
new South Africa.  However South Africa lacked a vibrant Civic Society Organisations 
(CSO) or social movements following the co-option of South African National Civics 
Organisation (SANCO) into the tripartite alliance and it assuming governing role in the 
local governing structures. 
 
SANCO was formed in 1992.  The intention was to establish an umbrella body of civics 
to facilitate the activities of the national civic organisations.  ‗When leading United 
Democratic Front (UDF)  activists and civic leaders met in Bloemfontein in May 1991 to 
discuss the formation of a national civic, rumors spread that the creation of this civic 
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structure, which promised to be independent of the ANC, would effectively take masses of 
UDF supporters away from the ANC‘ (Zuern, 2006, pg 6).  This debate continued long after 
the 1994 elections. However these fears were temporarily allayed when Pat Lephunya a 
Soweto civic leader suggested that, ‗the civics could define themselves as an autonomous, 
non-party political movement in civil society‘ (Zuern, 2005, pg 183).  Nonetheless, 
considerable suspicion concerning the role of civics remained, ‗as it became increasingly 
clear that an academic understanding of civil society as outside of political society would be 
impossible to follow in practice‘ (Zuern 2005, pg 12).  Consequently the ANC started 
cajoling SANCO and when Nelson Mandela came to power he appointed certain members of 
SANCO, Mlungisi Ngubane and Moses Mayekiso were appointed to parliament as members 
of parliament.  Whether this was the way to weaken SANCO or just a political gesture 
acknowledging SANCO‘s role in the struggle is the question which remains to be answered.  
However suffice to say that the cooption of certain leaders of SANCO to the government had 
a negative effects on SANCO.  Zuern argues that since 1994, SANCO has lost many of its 
leaders to government this has led the National General Council to reverse its earlier policy 
of allowing individuals to remain in their leadership positions in SANCO while also 
accepting government roles.  Furthermore Zuern continues to argue that this policy was 
bound to fail from the start.  ‗How will a SANCO leader, who also holds the position of 
councilor, conduct himself if he is called on to lead a march of residents against the local 
authority? Who will he lead the march against himself?‘(Zuern, 2004 pg 186).  Many 
SANCO‘s dissidents have blamed the ANC‘s over involvement and obsession with SANCO 
for its current state of affairs.  However the bulk of the blame for SANCO‘s current state 
must be attributed to its own myopia and careerism by its leadership.  Gumede argues that ‗ 
by 1997, Mbeki had the key SANCO leaders in his pocket‘ (Gumede, 2005, pg 276).  These 
leaders were promised government positions and they were used by the ANC to purge all 
possible opposition to the ANC within SANCO.  The main opponents to the dominance of 
the ANC in SANCO affairs came mainly from former President Moses Mayekiso and 
Mzwanele Mayekiso.  This courting occurs at the very critical time in the transitional period 
of South Africa.  It happened when South Africa was trying to convince the world that it was 
ready to lead in economics and politics in Africa.  Chapter one of this report will examine 
SANCO and investigate closely the reasons which led to its demise and the link between that 
and the emergence of the social movements. 
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Unlike in many other transitional societies where the political honeymoon tended to drag 
on for decades, new social struggles in South Africa emerged surprisingly quickly 
(Ballard, et al , 2006, pg 2).  The first backlash against government policies came soon 
after Mandela assumed power but Mbeki‘s term in office saw ‗overlapping but distinct 
types of struggles‘ emerging.  Ballard, et al argues that these struggles emerged as the 
result of government‘s adoption of certain socio economic policies like Growth 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) as the macro economic policy.  These 
organisations argue that the liberalisation of the markets as a result of GEAR has led to 
retrenchment of people especially in the textile industry.  According to the general 
secretary of the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union Ebrahim Patel, more 
than a thousand jobs were still being lost every month in the clothing, textile, and the 
leather industries in the first six months of 2003 (Desai, 2004).  Furthermore ‗struggles 
emerged to directly challenge the local enforcement of government‘s policies and to 
resist government‘s attempt at repression‘ (Ballard, et al , 2006, pg2).   
 
There have been accusations against the NSM‘s of being elitist, not representative and 
not reflecting popular discontent.  In his argument against the formation of Soweto 
Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) Tankiso of the ANC Pimville branch wrote in 
Umrabulo, the ANC publication, that SECC is an organisation which emerged ‗out of 
vengeance‘.  That SECC ‗blindly embark on unsustainable campaigns to settle personal 
vendetta against the ANC by manipulating unsuspecting members of the community‘ 
(Tankiso, 2003).  Trevor Ngwane an expelled member of the African National Congress 
(ANC)  now the leader of the SECC participated in the municipal elections of 2005 as the 
Operation Khanyisa Movement candidate for Pimville Branch 22.  Tankiso‘s argument 
however cannot be applied to the activism of the TAC.  Zackie Achmat of the TAC 
continues to be a member of the ANC and has to many not shown signs of bitterness.  
The financial Mail named Achmat as their Politician of the Decade in their special 
supplement to commemorate ten years of democracy in April 2004.  And he was 
nominated for the Nobel Peace Price a year later (Calland, 2006, pg 251).   
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The year 2001 is regarded as the year which launched the new social activism in South 
Africa.  The United Nations World Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination and 
Xenophobia and the World Summit on Sustainable Development which were held in 
Durban in August 2001 and in Johannesburg in September 2002 respectively, are 
regarded by many as the two main events which re-launched the new civil activism in 
South Africa.  Desai in his book We are the Poors argues that within South Africa, the 
conferences had a very different significance.  He argues that to some outside observers 
they might have confirmed the symbolic role of the ANC in global struggles against 
oppression, but for the oppressed in South Africa ‗it was an opportunity to create the first 
radical national organ of the left since 1994‘ (Desai,2006, pg 233).  Prior to the 
conference Durban Social Forum was established to plan for the activities of the social 
movements outside the conference.  Desai further argues that the name Durban Social 
Forum ‗gestured respectfully and militantly towards the Genoa Social Forum which, only 
months before, had presided over the biggest anti capitalist demonstrations Europe had 
seen, perhaps, since 1968, Durban community wanted to be part of this broad movement‘ 
(Desai, 2006, pg 124).  The essential context of the World Social Forum‘s emergence is 
the international movement against neo-liberal globalization and the rise of international 
bodies of global governance (Schonleiter, 2003, pg 127).  World Social Forum is an 
alternative platform to the World Economic Forum an annual event of the rich and key 
decision makers of the world.  The intermingling at the World Social Forum is used as 
international solidarity platform of the new left.  Anti Privatisation Forum (APF) regards 
itself as part of a global anti-globalization movement fighting against the dominant 
discourse and practice of neo-liberalism (Buhlungu, 2006, pg 83).   
 
Globalisation and neo-liberal policies have often been cited as the main reasons for the 
emergence of the new social movement post 1994 in South Africa.  However it is 
difficult to directly link these two issues to grassroots human sufferings.  The purpose of 
this report is to understand the nature of the new social movement by looking at the 
proximate causes which triggered their various responses.  Furthermore this report will 
interrogate the dominance and popularity of these proximate causes, are they serious 
enough to lead to an establishment of a movement.  Understanding their seriousness will 
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help to answer the question of origins of these movements, whether these movements are 
products of certain few individuals or they represent popular views, whether these 
movements reflect popular discontent, represent a genuine alternative to the current 
government‘s policies, whether these movements are democratic in the manner in which 
they organise and whether they are truly grassroots movements and not elite driven 
movements by a group of academics and disgruntled former activists.  This report will 
examine activities of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and the Landless People‘s 
Movement (LPM) to answer this question. 
 
This report will be a qualitative report in nature it will use overviews and historical 
backgrounds from secondary literature and media reports.  It will conduct elite interviews 
with certain leaders of the National Social Movements (NSM).  It will identify these 
interviewees from the use of literature on the NSM and historical literature.  It will seek 
to solicit the answers on the following questions from the interviewees: Did neo-liberal 
economics of the ANC create the crisis that led to the formation of the movements?  
What in particular within neo-liberalism led to the formation of each movement?  There 
are accusations directed at the intellectuals within the various social movements that most 
of them are suffering from nostalgia of the 1980‘s political activism hence their 
involvement in the new social movements.  Others within the ANC accuse the leadership 
in the new social movements of being bitter because they missed the ANC gravy train so 
their involvement in these social movements is their way of coming back to the 
mainstream politics.  How true are these accusations and to what extent has the 
involvement of former activists and intellectuals in these social movements affected the 
outcomes of these movements? 
 
There have been numerous publications on the reasons for the emergence of the NSMs.  
However less has been published on the proximate grass-root causes which triggered 
their emergence and the extent to which these proximate causes are the consequence of 
broader international trends.  Furthermore the cooption of SANCO into the tripartite 
alliance has also featured prominently in many publications but few publications have 
linked that with the emergence of the NSM‘s.  This report will investigate the link 
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between the cooption of SANCO into the tripartite and the emergence of the NSM‘s.  
This report will also look at the new competing roles of SANCO and NSM‘s.  It will also 
look initial at commonalities and later at the origins of the conflict between the 
government and the TAC.  This report hope that the information gathered from the 
exploration of these issues will contribute positively in the current debate on NSM‘s 
The first chapter will investigate the extent to which the involvement of SANCO in the 
local governing structures and its close alliance to the ANC affected the civil society.  
Did this really create a vacuum in civic activism which necessitated a replacement?  
Chapter two of this report will analyse the macro economice policy of the South African 
government and investigate what various backlashes has it invited.  Chapter three and 
four of this report will examine the case studies on the Treatment Action Campaign and 
the Landless People‘s Movement and investigate their grievances, what contributed to 
these grievances, and how these two movements have and still continue to address these 
grievances. 
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Chapter 2 South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) and the end 
of civic activism post 1994 
 
2.1 The historical background of SANCO 
SANCO is a broad church organisation which bases its organizational model not on any 
explicit occupational, educational, income, gender or other identity but upon residential 
proximity.  Before the formalization of the civics under the umbrella body called 
SANCO, South African civil society had various active players tackling socio-
economical and political issues.  In 1972 for an example South African Students 
Organisation (SASO) together with personalities from (rather conservative) African 
religious and educational bodies established the Black People‘s Convention (BCP)‘.  The 
BPC was affiliated to the Black Consciousness Movement which played an important role in 
the formation of the first civic structures i.e. Soweto Civic Association (SCA) and the Port 
Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO).  PEBCO ‗the organisation‘s very name which 
was not changed to PEPCO (Port Elizabeth People‘s Civic Organisation) until the late 
1980‘s, demonstrates its affiliation with Black Consciousness philosophy‘ (Zuern, 2004, pg 
4) 
 
The Soweto branch of the Black People Convention called for the formation of a properly 
representative civic organisation reflecting popular aspirations in the township (Lodge, 1999 
pg353).  The task of the formation of the civic organisations was given to the committee 
which later became known as the Committee of Ten.  The first steps to organise a Soweto 
Civic Association were taken in September 1979, two years after the Committee had been 
formed.  The formation of Soweto Civic Association chaired by Dr Nthato Motlana, a 
prominent medical practitioner and a former African National Congress Youth League 
(ANCYL) activist before his first restriction order in the early 1950‘s, helped to motivate 
the formation of other civics organisation in different parts of South Africa.  The SCA 
emerged ‗in the last few years as an alternative to the Community Councils, the local 
bodies created by the state in 1977-8 to replace the discredited Bantu Council‘ (Lodge, 
1990 pg 353).  Other black townships who had similar experiences with the state 
sponsored Bantu Councils formed similar structures.  Civics played a very important role 
during the period when most black political organisations where banned, they gave hope 
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to many people following the banning of the liberation movements.  The struggle of the 
civic organisations was initially concentrated at the service delivery in the black 
townships, however political rhetoric dominated at their gatherings which often linked 
the local suffering to national apartheid policies.   
 
Secondly the civic were against the Koornhof Bills and the state‘s new dispensation for 
urban African people.  The Bills set up black municipal councils to run their own affairs 
and granted urban status to employed people in approved accommodations, meaning no 
shanties or leased rooms.  Rent and service charges had become an issue because of the 
state‘s policy of making residents pay for the upgrading of their townships (Seekings, 
2000, pg 121).  Later in the 1980‘s following the regime‘s crackdown on the civics, the 
politicized street committees, which were loosely aligned to the civics, resumed an active 
role in the streets in the black townships.  Although there was an ever present possibility 
that the townships could reach an explosive situation, the street committees helped to 
assert relative calm.  The street committees had substantial number of young activists 
who presented serious challenges in the form of social disorder in the mid 1980‘s to the 
apartheid regime.  It was the intervention of the elders from the street committees and the 
civics who brought sense to the young activists.  The Parent‘s committees, which 
consisted of members of the street committees, for an example in their attempt to defuse 
tensions in the townships sent a memorandum to meet with the Deputy Minister of 
Education and Training in order to persuade the government to accept key student 
demands, especially for democratic Student Representative Councils (SRC) (Seekings, 
2000, pg 125).   
 
The formation of the UDF in 1983 was interpreted by many as the rebirth of the BPC 
albeit under the stewardship of the Charterists.  Many argued that not since the collapse 
of BPC, was there a similar formation which included various players from the civil 
society representing diverse interests like the UDF.  The UDF revived civic and political 
activism in the black townships.  Later with its swelling political popularity played an 
important role in setting the national political agenda and political strategies.  In 1991 the 
UDF helped form the National Interim Civics Committee (NICC), a precursor to 
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SANCO.  This was prompted by the inevitability of disbandment following the un-
banning of the liberation movements.  It was during this time that the UDF presented to 
its National Working Council‘s conference a proposal seeking clarity whether the 
organisation should ‗either disband altogether or be transformed into what was later to be 
called a developmental front‘ ( Seekings, 2000, pg 275).  Indeed, emergent civic sectoral 
leaders were amongst the most fervent opponents of the UDF‘s continuation in any form 
(Seeking, 2000, pg 278), for obvious reasons they did not want to compete with the UDF 
in a democratic South Africa.  After lengthy discussions the UDF‘s national executive 
committee took a decision to disband.  The last meeting was held on 14 August 1991 in 
Johannesburg, the agenda was short and the National Executive Committee‘s (NEC) last 
decision was to commission a book on the history of the UDF. 
 
2.2  SANCO’s Post 1994 political dilemma 
Overall, however the UDF dissolved amidst ambiguity about civics‘ roles and at a time 
when civic organisation was generally weak (Seeking, 2000, pg 280).  The UDF and 
civic leaders failed to ‗lay out exactly how the civic structure as a whole, and individual 
civic branches in particular would relate to the ANC and the new government‘(Zuern, 
2004, pg 5).  The UDF assumed that by lobbying for certain members of the civics to 
leadership of the new national civic structure it was going to permanently tranquilise the 
civics adversarial relationship with the ANC.  The chairperson of the NICC Tembisile 
Bete who had been nominated but not appointed as a national civic co-ordinator in 1990 
had clashed repeatedly with the regional UDF leadership regarding SANCO‘s future role 
in South African politics.  There were indeed sharp personal and political animosities 
surrounding the formation of a national civic body (Seekings, pg 282).  The existence of 
politically independent civics has always been of great concern to certain members within 
the mass democratic movement days leading to the disbandment of the UDF.  The fact 
that the Charterists UDF was willing to transfer it assets to the civics was with the 
understanding that they (SANCO) were going to play a developmental role not an 
adversarial role relative to the ANC.  This was the financial bait to buy their 
commitment.  Nonetheless, the considerable suspicion concerning the role of civics 
remained, as it became increasingly clear that an academic understanding of civil society 
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as outside of political society would be impossible to follow in practice (Zuern, 2004, pg 
6).  The newly un-banned ANC was genuinely also concerned about the political 
independence of the civics.  As such, the creation of a national civic body presented an 
uncomfortable challenge to the newly legalised ANC.  The ANC was threatened by the 
new environment and it had to do all in its power to gain full control of socio-political 
spheres of the new South Africa.  After much courting and cajoling the ANC managed to 
get consensus from SANCO and went to the 1994 elections having the support of 
SANCO.  In 1994 Mandela was swift in his attempts to sanitise SANCO by appointing 
certain of its leaders to his Government of National Unity.  SANCO suffered even more 
than COSATU and the SACP when leaders such as former president Moses Mayekiso 
were given government jobs after 1994 (Gumede, 2005, pg 274).  Moses Mayekiso was 
appointed to the national parliament as the ordinary member of parliament. 
 
2.2.1 Factionalism within SANCO  
Two years after its launch, SANCO found itself in the same position as the UDF, they 
needed to redefine their role in the new South Africa.  The normalisation of South 
African politics in 1994 saw many once formidable civic groups run out of steam 
(Gumede, 2005, pg 274).  SANCO‘s greatest challenge post 1994 was how it should 
relate to the new government and what its role should be in the civil society henceforth.  
Pat Lephunya, Soweto civic leader at the time, described three options available to the 
civics (Zuern, 2001, pg 5).  The first option was simply for local civics to fold or become 
ANC branches or ANC residents associations.  Second, local civics could enter local 
government by effectively taking over administration of their communities.  Third, the 
civics could define themselves as an autonomous, non-party-political movement in civil 
society (Collinge, 1991, pg 8).  These proposals which were later tabled before the 
National Governing Council (NGC) of SANCO culminated into various factions within 
the leadership.  Moses Mayekiso the first president of SANCO was quoted in 1997 as 
saying that ‗SANCO will not work with the governing party however if its policies go 
against the interest of the community‘ (Zuern, 2004, pg 7).  In 1996 Mlungisi Hlongwane 
who served in the executive led by Moses Mayekiso argued that if anyone ‗wants to be an 
instant revolutionary these days and be involved in boycotts, SANCO is no longer a 
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home for you‘ (Zuern, 2004, pg 6).  In a turn of events Moses Mayekiso the first 
president of SANCO and one of those who argued for no-partisan relationship with the 
government became the national Member of Parliament.  Moses Mayekiso came from 
CAST (Civic Association of the Southern Transvaal), formed in September 1991.  CAST 
was ‗dominated by civic activists antipathetic to the UDF leadership‘ (Seekings, 2000, pg 
271).   
 
After 1994 because of various reasons including mismanagement, SANCO was 
desperately short of resources.  By 1996, SANCO had also lost its last significant external 
donor support, leading the national office to cut it remaining two administrative staff 
members to six others had left earlier in the year (Mail and Guardian, 1996, pg10).  In 
addressing the crisis of shortage of resources SANCO formed SANCO investment 
Holdings in 1995, Moses Mayekiso was appointed its first managing director.  Moses 
Mayekiso resigned under a cloud of corruption following the missing millions in the 
SANCO wholly owned SANCO Investment Holdings.  He formed a new national civic 
structure called the Congress for South African non Racial Civic Organisations 
Movement (Cosancom).  This new structure was similar to that which was formed in 
1998 by the Soweto branch chairman of SANCO, Ali Tleane called the National 
Association of Residents‘ Civic Organisations (NARCO).  Tleane, like Mayekiso, ‗loudly 
criticised SANCO leadership‘s muted response to the government‘s slow service delivery 
and conservative economic policies‘ (Gumede, 2005, pg 276).  The exodus of strong 
leaders such as Ali Tleane, Moses Mayekiso and Mzwanele Mayekiso of the Alexandra 
Township Civic Association paved the way for the election of Mlungisi Hlongwane as 
the new President of SANCO.  In late 1997, the leadership of the Transkei region broke 
away from the national body, citing SANCO‘s ties with the ANC as a major concern 
(Lodge, 1999, pg 90).  However, after 1999 elections not even SANCO could contain the 
rising grassroots unhappiness the Mbeki-ites within the movement appealed to the ANC 
to take more seriously calls for greater grassroots involvement in policy-making 
(Gumede, 2005, pg286)  In 1999, a number of SANCO regions in the Eastern Cape 
passed a vote of no-confidence in their provincial executive committee.  The regions also 
agreed to oust all SANCO executives who simultaneously held political posts (Daily 
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Dispatch, 1999, pg3).  SANCO became the ‗playground of failed ANC politicians hoping 
to hitch a ride on the last coach of the gravy train, and a convenient arena in which the 
ANC alliance‘s power games were often played out‘ (Gumede, 2005, pg284).   
 
2.2.2 GEAR and the disillusionment of SANCO 
The civics movement of the 1980s was in many respects the most prominent and high-
profile community-based component of black civil society.   At the local level most 
regarded SANCO as the conduit which could ensure that their local concerns can receive 
attention they deserve.  ‗Civics give voice to the poor and historically marginalized they 
play a potentially critical role in deepening democracy‘ (Heller and Nhlokonkulu, 2001, 
pg 6).  The ANC like most national liberation movements in Africa promised 
reconstruction and it also promised to address past socioeconomic inequalities.  The 
Redistribution and Development Program (RDP) a South African macro economic 
policy, was intended to address these inequalities.  Five years later in his last speech as 
the President of South Africa, Mandela barely mentioned the RDP. When it was 
mentioned it was no longer an existing living thing. It was now tellingly an ―RDP of the 
soul‖ (Desai, 2004, pg1).   
 
The failure to fulfill these promises elicited fury and disgruntlement.  The RDP was 
replaced by a neo-liberal macro economic policy GEAR (Growth Employment and 
Redistribution Program), a homegrown Structural Adjustment Program.  Delegates at the 
civics‘ national conference in 2000 railed bitterly against the newly adopted GEAR, and 
pushed through a motion ordering senior SANCO leaders to withdraw from government 
office (Gumede, 2005, pg276).  Moses Mayekiso was recalled from the national 
parliament and Mlungisi Hlongwane was instructed to quit as the mayor of the Vaal 
Triangle.  Furthermore protesting against GEAR, SANCO entered into An anti GEAR 
coalition with COSATU to oppose the Egoli 2002 privatisation process.  The ANC was 
not pleased with this alliance and a rumour started circulating that the ANC‘s national 
executive committee would support Moses Mayekiso‘s new civic Cosancom (Mail and 
Guardian, 2001, pg7) indeed as intended this rumour dissuaded SANCO from the 
coalition.  The ANC was clearly frustrated by SANCO‘s support for the growing anti 
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GEAR campaign championed not only by Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) but also by new bodies such as the Anti Privatisation Forum (APF), which 
ANC leaders had collectively branded as ‗ultra left‘.   
 
The ‗pro-Mbekite‘ Mlungisi Hlongwane fearing isolation by the ANC managed to lobby 
major SANCO decision makers out of the coalition with COSATU, accusing the senior 
members of COSATU of using the privatisation as an excuse to challenge the leadership 
of the ANC.  Hlongwane argued at the time that ‗ the tone had changed because we 
started realizing that the issues that COSATU was advancing were beginning to be much 
broader that just fighting against privatisation, but it was beginning to question the 
leadership of the ANC and the alliance‘(Zuern, 2004, page 18).  The opposition to GEAR 
mainly stems from its amenability to Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP).  SAP‘s 
generally require countries to devalue their currencies against the major currencies 
especially the US Dollar; lift import and export restrictions; balance their budgets and not 
overspend; and remove price controls and state subsidies.  The relaxation of economic 
protection programs and the coercion to implement SAP by the IMF, World Bank and 
other financial international institution opens up vulnerabilities of small economies, 
especially in the developing world.   
 
At the local level however the repercussions of the SAP‘s surfaced when the government 
started privatizing government‘s institutions in charge of supplying basic services to the 
public.  The privatisation of water and electricity embarrassed SANCO within the ruling 
alliance and moreover it was the former leaders of SANCO within the local 
municipalities who had to implement the privatisation.  Privatisation of state apparatuses 
added more to the division within the already fragmented SANCO.  Members felt that the 
ANC should have also consulted SANCO before adopting this policy.  Early 2000, 
Mbeki and the ANC leadership were shocked to learn that a group of SANCO leaders 
were contemplating the formation of a political party to contest local government 
elections (Gumede, 2005, pg276).  This move was seen as a direct backlash to the 
economics of the ruling ANC.  SANCO‘s 2001 national conference was a heated affair, 
with Mbeki personally addressing the delegates.  His conciliatory stance and humble 
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admission of government‘s shortcomings included the promise of future inclusion in 
policy making, and hinted at a more expansionist economic policy.   
 
It is argued that South African democracy needs a strong opposition to the ruling ANC 
for its survival.  The current political parties in parliament cannot play that role because 
of the historical baggage.  The Inkatha Freedom Party and the DA lack political 
credibility because of their political past.  Only a strong civil society could be able to 
challenge the political dominance of the ANC and install a sense of accountability 
especially in the local government structures.  The inability of SANCO to effectively deal 
with the challenges post 1994 left a huge vacuum in this regard.  Before the un-banning 
of the liberation movements the civics and the UDF (United Democratic Front) 
championed the struggles of the society, from lack of water supply to national liberation.  
SANCO which was meant to have continued with this struggle following the 
disbandment of the UDF failed to do so.   
 
SANCO was certainly weakened by its alliance with the ruling ANC.  Hlongwane in his 
presidential address at the Third National Conference of SANCO ‗noted the need for 
SANCO to strengthen its relationship with the ANC, but now as an equal partner‘(Zuern, 
2004, pg 17).  In 2002 Thabo Mbeki in his presidential address to the civic movement 
referred to SANCO ‗as a full alliance partner, holding equal status with COSATU and the 
SACP‘ (Gumede, 2005 pg 279). The dream of being a ‗revolutionary social movement‘ 
was compromised by such rhetoric.  Furthermore this new political trajectory planted the 
seed of disunity within SANCO‘s constituency and leadership.  This led to the national 
conference, the highest decision making body of SANCO, to call for the resignation of its 
President Mlungisi Hlongwane.  Fighting for political survival Hlongwane pushed for a 
resolution which saw the inclusion of two senior ANC members in the national executive 
committee of SANCO.  The inclusion of these members in the executive committee 
unfortunately served to further compromise chances of SANCO converting into a 
‗revolutionary social movement ‘.  In 2006 President of SANCO Hlongwane did the 
unthinkable by suggesting that Thabo Mbeki should run as the president of South Africa 
for the third term.  This statement invited widespread criticism from various quarters of 
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the society but more harsh criticism came from the ANCYL.  The ANCYL has opposed 
the idea of the ANC president standing for a third term as the president of the ANC.  
They argue that this will create two tiers of power, one being the president of the republic 
and the other being the president of the ANC.  The African National Congress (ANC) 
Youth League yesterday poured cold water on a proposal to amend SA‘s constitution and 
allow President Thabo Mbeki to serve a third term, becoming the latest body to dismiss 
the proposal by the South African National Civic Organisation (Business Day, 2007, 
pg10 ).  Hlongwane in defense of his proposal argued that he made a proposal because he 
believes that the country needed to maintain capable people in leadership position.  
SANCO under the leadership of Hlogwane has and continues to lose credibility as a 
viable social movement.  Its ‗national‘s lack of financial viability and its close relationship 
to the ANC, led many local branches which continued to operate, to become increasingly 
critical of the national structure and its top-down approach‘ (Zuern, 2004, pg9) but most 
importantly its lack of political independence within the ruling alliance has crippled it.  
Unlike COSATU and SACP which continue to challenge sociopolitical and economic 
policies of the ANC, SANCO dances to the tune of the ANC.  
 
SANCO‘s inability to challenge GEAR left a vacuum which gave birth to new actors in 
the civil society.  In 2000 and 2001, SANCO did, however engage in a number of actions 
that directly challenged the core principles of the governments‘ macro-economic policy 
(Zuern, 2004, pg188).  However their premature withdrawal from the campaign created 
more divisions in SANCO.  Indeed some local SANCO leaders defied SANCO‘s call, 
which they first heard on radio 702, to withdraw their support for the anti-privatisation 
strike (Zuern, 2004, pg189).  The withdrawal of SANCO from the campaign and 
‗COSATU‘s failure to provide leadership, consistent resistance to neo-liberalism and a 
coherent alternative to capitalism has left working class communities to fight water and 
electricity cuts and evictions on their own‘ (Buhlungu, 2006, pg75).  Anti Privatisation 
Forum (APF) is as a result emerged as the dominating movement against anti 
privatisation.   Many who joined this movement are former activists the commentators 
argue feels that injustices of apartheid are repeated in a different guise.  Others, the 
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argument continues, many are simply nostalgic activists who are in search of a relevant 
struggle.   
 
Whilst all this was happening people were losing patience on other government inabilities 
and lack of service delivery.  The scourge of HIV and AIDS continued to affect many 
people in South Africa.  South African government is seen to be dragging its feet in 
dealing with this challenge.  The Treatment Action Campaign was formed in Cape Town 
to protest government‘s failure to tackle the challenges of this pandemic.  Various smaller 
issue - based organisation joined forces and formed umbrella bodies like the Social 
Movement Indaba and the Concerned Citizens Forum from Durban.  Although many 
organisations continue to operate independently from these bodies, coalitions are often 
formed on certain issues of mutual interest.  The ANC reaction to the emergence of the 
new social movements has been but hostile at best.  The president of the ANC, Thabo 
Mbeki, accused these movements of furthering foreign agendas in South Africa .   
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Chapter 3 The emergence of the new Social Movements in South Africa post 
1994 
3.1 Introduction  
The ANC government managed to address many sociopolitical and economical issues but 
it is still trailing in addressing many other issues particularly unemployment, HIV/AIDS 
and poverty.  The ANC led municipalities are awash with corrupt and incompetent public 
officials who are failing in addressing the daily needs of the community and in rectifying 
past injustices.  This inability to deal efficiently with socioeconomic and political 
urgencies and the failure to meet political promises made before the first democratic 
elections in 1994, has invited various backlashes from the community in the form of the 
emergence of the New Social Movements (NSM).  The democratic honeymoon and 
respect most activists had for Nelson Mandela suppressed various forms of backlashes 
and criticism against the ANC and its new capitalist trajectory.  It was after Thabo Mbeki 
inherited the presidency that the NSMs emerged in earnest.   
 
Appropriately the NSM‘s have challenged the ever growing political monopoly of the 
ruling ANC.  They have organised marches and protests at various times throughout the 
country, others like the Treatment AAction Campaign (TAC) have used lawyering very 
effectively.  The current political opposition could not challenge the ANC effectively 
because of the past political baggage.  Apart from the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 
AZAPO and sections of the newly formed Independent Democrats, ‗most parties were 
either opposed to the creation of the contemporary democratic order, associated with 
apartheid, or had a very ambiguous relationship to the creation of democracy‘(Suttner, 
2004, pg8).  The NSM‘s continue to blame the ANC macro economic policy for the 
social delivery backlog.  With no formal structure directing the community action against 
government‘s failure in delivering basic social services, these movements have 
sometimes resorted to disruptive and violent means when voicing their concerns.   
 
The key explanation for the newness of today‘s generation of social movements is that 
old avenues of opposition were absorbed into the post-apartheid government, thus leaving 
opponents of the government without a voice which to express or a mechanism to 
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organise opposition (Ballard, et al, 2006, pg 15).  The tacit pledge made by the civics to 
restrict their activities to reconstruction and development as discussed in the previous 
chapter, essentially stripped the civics of its historical role of being ‗watchdogs‘.  Social 
Movements seized to criticize the government and challenge government‘s policies, most 
civil society organisation became extended arms of the state in development and 
construction.  ‗The NSM however helped to create citizens once again‘ as Zackie Achmat 
argues.  Maureen Mnisi of the Landless People‘s Movement (LPM) agrees ‗LPM serves a 
very important role in becoming a voice in the community impeded by bureaucracy and 
low level of education (Maureen Mnisi, Interview, 2005).  Buhlungu correctly argues that 
the emergence of the social movements should be seen as a ‗pattern of independent 
mobilisation at times when the national liberation movement is absent or failing to act on 
issues that affect a significant constituency‘ (Buhlungu, 2006, pg68).   
 
The policy u turn by the ANC from Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) to 
Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) ‗a neo-liberal inspired policy package‘ 
(Bond, 2000, pg92) was the first step by the government which invited nationwide 
protests in South Africa post 1994.  The NSM did not necessarily protest against GEAR 
as the macro economic policy initially but it was issues like the unavailability of land, 
installation of water meters in Soweto and the unavailability of cheap drugs in the main 
which triggered the protests.  Many argue that it was only later when the academics 
entered the cause that all these socio-economical woes were, correctly so, linked to 
GEAR.  During the Social Movement Indaba march in Johannesburg on Human Rights 
day in April 2007 most activists were chanting ‗ asiyifuni i GEAR‘ (we do not want 
GEAR) when two members from the APF were asked if they knew what GEAR was, 
they both failed to give a satisfactory answers.  Although almost all members of the NSM 
are unanimous in their condemnation of GEAR, very few can explain the overall impact 
of GEAR outside their immediate concerns.   
 
Anti - GEAR campaign was first unveiled to many in a meeting at Wits University at the 
launch of the Anti Privatisation Forum (APF).  Buhlungu argues that what triggered the 
formation of Anti Privatisation Forum in Gauteng was Johannesburg City Council‘s Igoli 
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2002 plan and Wits University‘s cost cutting plan called Wits 2001.  These were seen by 
activists as manifestation of cost-cutting economic regime that was unfolding since the 
adoption of GEAR.  APF sees itself as part of the global anti globalisation and anti neo-
liberalism movement and it continues to introduce and presents itself as such at 
international gatherings.  The largest protest of the APF in South Africa against 
globalisation and neo-liberalism was when APF and its fraternal organisations under the 
banner of the Social Movements Indaba marched during the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002.   
 
AFP was the result of co-operation by three broad but not homogeneous groupings of the 
left.  First there were left activists within the ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance who felt a 
sense of frustration particularly after the adoption of GEAR by the ruling party.  These 
activists, Trevor Ngwane (ANC local government councilor), John Appolis (regional 
secretary of COSATU affiliate Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union (CEPPWAWU)) and Dale McKinley of the South African Communist 
party were later dismissed by their respective organisations.  After being expelled from 
the ANC in 1999 for his radical anti-privatisation stance, former Pimville councilor 
Trevor Ngwane founded the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) (Gumede, 
2005, pg280).  SECC was behind the illegal reconnection of electricity supplies cut off by 
Eskom for non-payment.  Ngwane argued that it was ‗criminal to rob people of 
necessities of life‘ (Mail and Guardian, 2003, pg7).  SECC also embarked on other 
disruptive campaigns such as operation Vula Amanzi (open the water) and Operation 
Buyela Endlini (return to your house) after the cutt off of water suppliers by the 
municipality for non payment and eviction of families from their homes for failure to 
make payment.  The highlight of SECC events was on 6 April 2002, nearly 100 SECC 
members, many of them pensioners, arrived at the mayor Amos Masondo‘s Kensington 
home to present a petition and protest against power cuts (Egan and Wafer, 2006,, pg53) 
 
These NSM‘s are ‗loose-knit many have overlapping leadership structures, with the same 
names cropping up in different contexts.  The leading lights include Marxist unionist or 
ex communists associated with the ‗workerist‘ rather than ‗nationalist‘ union factions in 
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the 1980‘s, and radical anti apartheid activists disenchanted with the ANC and its partner, 
the South African Communist Party (Mail and Guardian, 2003, pg6).  Although their 
struggle might have emanated from the grassroots, the NSM agenda has been largely 
affected the dictates of institutions like Social Movements Indaba for an example.  The 
over involvement of the SMI culminates sometimes to extreme positions towards the 
government.  Furthermore the NSM‘s rhetoric is very academic an in English which to an 
extent discourage the uneducated, who makes up the majority of the constituency of these 
movements, from participating in meetings and in policy formulation processes. 
 
3.2 World Social Forum and the New Social Movements in South Africa 
A crucial impetus for social movements in South Africa that provided coherence to the 
left activist and social movements was the emergence of the so called anti globalisation 
movement, the first in Seattle in 1999, and later in other cities in North America and 
Europe (Wainwright, 2003, pg70).  In 2001 South Africa hosted the World Conference 
Against Racism, Racial Discrimination and Xenophobia (WCAR) in Durban and World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2003.  These two 
international events rejuvenated the social movements and facilitated the re-launch of 
South African NSM‘s in the international scene.  South Africa was chosen as the country 
to host the third World Conference Against Racism, Discrimination and Xenophobia 
because of its success in defeating institutionalized racism and the processes put in place 
for a peaceful transformation to democracy and reconciliation (Desai, 2002, pg121).  
Years after these two events the South African NSM‘s started featuring prominently in 
most international platforms especially the World Social Forums.  Zackie Achmat from 
the Treatment Acton Campaign (TAC) became one of the most prominent international 
activists scooping several awards, honorary degrees and Nobel Peace nomination.  Trevor 
Ngwane the dreadlocked activist from Soweto also became a very prominent figure in the 
international anti neo-liberalism and anti-globalisation movement.  His status was further 
enhanced by the documentary produced by South African film maker Ben Cashdon called 
The Two Trevors. 
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The essential context of the Word Social Forum‘s emergence is the international 
movement against neo-liberal globalisation and the rise of international bodies of global 
governance (Schonleitner, 2003, pg78).  South Africa has been represented at the forum 
since its inception in 2001 in Porto Alegre, Brazil.  The international coordination and 
synchronization of the Anti War protests around the world on the eve of the invasion of 
Iraq by the US led coalition forces demonstrated how effective this platform has become.  
Internationalization of global struggles via different civic societies continues to highlights 
the importance of the WSF in directing and linking international leftist agenda.  The 
intermingling at the World Social Forum has encouraged helped to lobby South African 
NSM‘s to embrace other international and global causes, this is discussed in details in 
chapter 4.  The unity that is forged during the World Social Forum motivate South 
African activists can return to South Africa and pursue solidarity struggles.  The World 
Social Forum has also helped in localizing and linking global struggles throughout the 
world.  The Landless People Movement of South Africa managed to link their struggle 
with the Landless People‘s Movement of Brazil and other landless movement from across 
the globe.  The Palestinian Solidarity Committee for an example, managed to localize and 
mobilize for the struggle of the Palestinians in South Africa.  At the World Social Forum 
in 2002 the decision was taken ‗to integrate the Palestinian National cause in the Global 
Agenda of social movements and civil societies, as it is an integral part of the world 
movement towards human freedom‘ (The Palestine Monitor, 2002, pg1).   
 
Therefore the emergence of the NSM‘s can be attributed to a hybrid of various socio-
economical factors.  Globalisation of politics and markets has led to many changes in 
South Africa.  It is argued that South Africa has to adhere to international treaties and 
undertakings which in most instances serve the interests of the developed world.  The 
inability to manufacture generic medicines for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS) patients is one case in point.  Fearing expulsion and punishment by the World 
Trade Organisation, South Africa has not produced generic alternative drugs as it should 
to save millions of lives.  Developing countries including South Africa are now faced 
with unprecedented challenges in the global and local market.  Furthermore South Africa 
has witnessed the flooding of cheap goods from international markets which affect 
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employment.  The privatisation of the supply of basic services like water and electricity 
also continues to affect the poor majority in South Africa. 
 
The global nature of these challenges surely affect the majority of South Africans the 
including South African government.  This can only be addressed effectively through a 
partnership between the NSM and Global Social Movement (GSM).  The NSM‘s can 
play a role in changing some of these challenges facing South Africa.  The World Social 
Forum platform facilitates the exchange of international sociopolitical struggles.  One 
case in point which will be discussed later in detail is the successful campaign by the 
Treatment Action Campaign and GSM against the pharmaceutical companies.   
 
President Thabo Mbeki has accused the NSM of furthering insidious agenda dictated by 
foreign countries to destabilize South Africa.  At the opening of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism President Thabo Mbeki said ‗we have civil society organisations funded by 
the Americans, the Swedes, the Danes the Japanese who set agendas, who says these are 
the things we want‘ (The Star Newspaper, 2005, pg3).  Many argue that such rhetoric is 
not helpful it creates unnecessary tension instead of encouraging positive interaction with 
the NSM‘s which can also be helpful in government‘s shortfalls in their service delivery.  
The hard handedness of the South African Police Services in dealing with protests and 
demonstration organised by the NSM‘s reflect the government‘s attitude towards the 
NSM‘s.  In 2004 two members of the Landless People‘s Movement, Anne Everett and 
Mavis Mnisi, were physically and emotionally abused, whilst in police custody, by the 
police at the Protea police station in Soweto.  These are the same tactics that the apartheid 
regime used in the past which are now utilized by the South African government 
(Eveleth, interview).   
 
Ballard, et al argue that the New Social Movements in South Africa emerged responding 
‗ directly against government policies, others focused on government‘s failures in 
meeting basic needs and addressing socioeconomic rights and others directly challenging 
the local enforcement of government policies and to resist government attempts to 
repression‘ (Ballard, et al, pg 2).  The common denominator in all the reasons given 
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above is the government‘s failure to meet the needs of the people.  The following two 
chapters, chapter 4 and 5, will specifically look at the Treatment Action Campaign and 
the Landless People‘ Movements and investigate what were the proximate causes which 
triggered their formation. 
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Chapter 4 Examining the emergence of the Treatment Action Cam 
4.1 Introduction 
Not since the Black Death which decimated the population of Europe in the fourteenth 
century has a pandemic posed such a terrible threat to an entire continent as Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) does to 
Africa today (Sparks, 2003, pg 283).  Over the past two decades, 65 million people have 
become infected with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. Approximately 25 million people-
more than the aggregate battle deaths of the twentieth century combined-have lost their 
lives to this plague.  More than 40 million are currently infected.  Every day 8000 people 
die of AIDS (Behrman, 2004, pg147).  In South Africa numbers are staggering at the end 
of 2005 Unicef estimates that ‗3,100,000 women above the age of 15 years were living 
with HIV and 1,200,000 children between 0-17 years were orphans‘ (Unicef, 2007).  The 
scourge of AIDS and HIV gained momentum between 1991 and 1995.  It was a critical 
stage in South African history, and so the disease caught South Africa off guard.  It made 
its silent inroads as guerilla fighters, lonely men with pay, made their way home from 
infected areas to the north and while the apartheid regime and the liberation movements 
were locked in intense negotiations that absorbed all their attention (Sparks, 2003, pg 
284).  Sparks further argues that the returning of thousands of exiles after the un-banning 
of the liberation movements and the long transport routes from the North were probably 
the principal vectors of the disease.  Migrant labour who went to the cities of 
Johannesburg were barred from bringing their families to the cities because of apartheid 
laws.  This situation led to ‗a vast army of men severed from their families and forced 
into an unnatural lifestyle where they had multiple sexual relationships‘ (Van Wyk, 2003, 
pg1).  Precautions were not taken in ensuring that the threat of HIV/AIDS entering South 
Africa was minimized.  Moreover, because most who were returning to South Africa left 
under sensitive political circumstances, it would have been politically unwise to subject 
the returnees to medical testing before entering the country.  What further complicated 
the situation was that the first democratic South Africa under the leadership of Nelson 
Mandela ‗remained practically silent on AIDS until he addressed it at he World 
Economic Forum-notably Davos, Switzerland, not his home country-in 1997‘ (Behrman, 
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2004, pg202).  Furthermore ‗in 1993 when an advisory panel recommended that the 
government allocate $64 million to combat AIDS, Mandela reportedly proposed only $15 
million (Behrman, 2004, pg202).  Mandela was unable to deal with AIDS/HIV 
effectively because of three main reasons.  He was too busy with other things he mostly 
delegated duties to his ministers hoping they will do a good job and he suffered from 
African conservatism which dictated that sexual discussion are not to be held in public.  
People told him not to speak to young people about sex (Interview, Zackie Achmat, 
2007).  However Achmat acknowledges that not withstanding all of the above 
shortcomings, Nelson Mandela oversaw the implementation of the best AIDS plan that 
South Africa has ever had, The National AIDS plan. 
 
The politics of AIDS and HIV and the rolling out of antiretroviral drugs for people 
infected by the virus in South Africa are sensitive and complicated.  These politics are 
complicated first by those people, including those in government, who believe that this is 
some kind of conspiracy directed at black people.  This conspiracy is fed by the historical 
fact that during apartheid the government had sponsored a clandestine germ warfare 
program that was accused of targeting ANC officials.  Secondly a presidency under 
Thabo Mbeki which has introduced various forms of obstacles in addressing the 
pandemic.  Thabo Mbeki initially eagerly backed a counterfeit remedy Virodene that had 
been developed by a group of Pretoria University researchers and which the new 
government hoped would reduce the crippling costs of dealing with the disease (Sparks, 
2003, pg 285).  The drug was rejected when the Medicines Control council discovered 
that its active ingredient was an industrial solvent that cause severe liver damage.  
Professor Malegapuru Makgoba, renowned microbiologist who is now the President of 
the Medical Research Council, argues that when the hope that Virodene was the right 
cure and would reduce the cost of dealing with the disease the government retreated 
behind revisionist theories (Sparks, 2003, pg 285).  AIDS revisionists or dissidents argue 
amongst other things that AIDS is caused by lifestyle factors such as poverty or 
malnutrition, not the HIV virus, which they contend was a harmless passenger virus.  
Mbeki did not have these views initially.  His enthusiasm and backing of Virodene in 
1997 is evident of that.   
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Stranded and not knowing which step to take the then Minister of Health Nkosazana 
Zuma solicited an advice from an AIDS expert in the United States named Jamie Love.  
Love suggested to South African government that they should consider importing 
cheaper generic drugs.  He also suggested that South Africa should endorse compulsory 
licensing whereby South Africa would grant licenses to manufacturers to produce generic 
drugs at home making them cheaper still (Berhaman, 2004, pg145).  South African 
national leadership was at the time mulling over legislation to pursue ‗parallel trade‘ 
which would enable it to buy the life-extending antiretroviral drugs from other countries 
where they were sold for less.  Indeed this practice was not restricted by international 
law.  However ‗South Africa was keen to maintain its good international economic 
standing and wary of risking the ire of multinational pharmaceutical companies, foreign 
investors, or the Unite State Trade Representatives‘ (Berham,2004, pg145).  When 
Virodene was rejected as ‗toxic‘ the government resorted into passing the amendment to 
its Medicines and related Substances Act of which was effected in 1997.  The act was 
amended to address amongst many the following: to provide for procedures that will 
expedite the registration of essential medicines, and for the re-evaluation of all medicines 
after five years; to provide for measures for the supply of more affordable medicines in 
certain circumstances; to require labels to be approved by the council; to prohibit 
bonusing and sampling of medicines; to further regulate the control of medicines and 
Scheduled substances; to provide for the licensing of certain persons to compound, 
dispense or manufacture medicines; to provide for generic substitution of medicines; to 
provide for the establishment of a pricing committee: to regulate the purchase and sale of 
medicines by wholesalers; to regulate anew the Minister‘s power to make regulations: 
and to provide for the rationalisation of certain laws relating to medicines and related 
substances that have remained in force in various territories of the national territory of the 
Republic by virtue of section 229 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1993; and to provide for matters connected therewith (RSA Government Gazette, 1999, 
pg2).   
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The passing of the Medicines Act in 1997 infuriated many pharmaceutical companies.  
By early 1998 roughly forty pharmaceutical companies had sued South Africa over the 
Medicines Act.   The Act did not necessarily alleviate the problems in the poor affected 
communities of South Africa, it did lower the prices of drugs but it did not allocate funds 
to help subsidise the vast majority of poor infected South Africans.  Notwithstanding the 
fact that Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights agreement, supervised by the World 
Health Organisation, allows countries facing a national health emergency to undertake 
certain drastic measures, the big American drug companies-amongst them Glaxo 
Wellcome, the manufacturers of the Azidothymidine (AZT)-objected strongly (Sparks, 
2003, pg292) to the amendment.  The prices charged for medicines don‘t depend on how 
much they cost to produce, rather pharmaceutical companies that registers a new drug are 
given a patent for 20 years, during which time they can set their own prices for the drugs.  
During this period no other companies can manufacture the drug, so there is no 
competition to bring down the price, and the pharmaceutical companies will charge as 
much as possible to make the most profit. Once the patent expires other companies can 
manufacture generic versions of the drug – using the same active ingredients – and its 
price will drop considerably (TAC, 2003, pg6).  Sparks argue that the lawsuit by the 
pharmaceutical companies and restrictions imposed by the WTO infuriated the South 
African government particularly Mbeki.   
 
The relationship between the pharmaceutical companies and the South African 
government never recovered after these encounters.  When the antiretroviral drug 
manufactured by the U.S pharmaceutical company Pfizer was prescribed, South African 
government subjected it to cumbersome testing before it could be distributed.  The 
government went to an extent of calling the drug ‗toxic‘, advising people to have a 
balance diet instead if they wanted to stay healthy and to boost their immune system.  
Anthony Brink a lawyer whom Thabo Mbeki ‗confessed as the first person to draw his 
attention to the dissident website‘(Sparks, 2003,  pg286), called AZT ‗a medicine from 
hell‘(The Citizen, 1999, pg 7).  Sparks argues that Mbeki‘s ammunition against the drug 
and the pharmaceutical company that produces it stems from the book he stumbled upon 
while surfing the internet titled Debating AZT which suggests that AZT drug is toxic.  
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Mbeki went on to sponsor a group of dissidents to investigate the link between 
HIV/AIDS.  The AIDS/HIV dissidents argue that ‗AIDS is caused by lifestyle factors 
such as poverty or malnutrition, not the HI virus, which they contended is a harmless 
passenger virus as already stated.  Sparks continues to argue that most administration 
embraced Mbeki‘s views ‗including people who were literally dying of disease 
themselves‘ (Sparks, 2003, pg265).  However many argue that the death of Parks 
Mankahlana, presidential spokesperson and Peter Mokaba a national member of 
parliament both senior members of the government and the ANC was a wake up call to 
many in the administration. 
 
Criticism of AZT drug and the prevalent dissident views on HIV/AIDS within the 
corridors of the Union Building stalled the AZT drug rollout process.  The TAC was not 
pleased by the manner in which the government was addressing this national crisis.  In 
1998 the Health Minister Nkosazana Zuma withdrew government support for pilot 
projects to treat HIV-positive pregnant women to reduce the number of babies who 
contract HIV. (Pregnant women passing the virus to their offspring is referred to by one 
of the AIDS worlds‘ favourite acronyms – MTCT, which stands for mother to child 
transmission.  The TAC took the matter to court and won.  The Constitutional Court in 
July 2001 ordered the government to immediately implement the rollout of antiretroviral 
drugs for pregnant mothers (Calland, 2006, pg 250).  The government appealed the 
judgment.  However following the release of statistics that more than 25% of pregnant 
women were HIV positive and that between 70 000 and 100 000 babies were infected 
every year, calls opposing government‘s view escalated (Sparks, pg 266).  Nelson 
Mandela added his moral weight and urged the government to reconsider its position.  
This was the turning point in the relationship between the government and the Treatment 
Action Campaign.   
 
4.2 The Treatment Action Campaign’s (TAC) fight with the pharmaceutical 
 companies 
The TAC was launched on the International Human rights Day, 10 December 1998.  The 
TAC ‗campaigns for greater access to treatment for all South Africans, by raising public 
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awareness and understanding about issues surrounding the availability, affordability and 
use of HIV treatment‘(Friedman and Mottiar, 2006, pg23).   The TAC‘s most 
strategically important ally may have been the one formed with international GSMs.  
When the South African government introduced the amendment to the Medicines and 
Related Substances Act in 1997, the pharmaceutical companies as already stated took 
South Africa to court.  The big drug companies in South Africa including Glaxo 
Wellcome who manufacture AZT objected strongly to the amendments. More than forty 
of them filed suit in the South African Constitutional Court to bar the amendment, 
claiming it violated their intellectual property rights (Sparks, 2003, pg 292).   South 
Africa‘s aid was suspended, and its economic standing denigrated when it was put on 
infamous ―301 Watch List‖ (Behrman, 2004, pg 147) of countries that could face 
economic sanctions because of attempts by the South African government to reduce the 
prices of essential medicines by introducing the Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Act of 1997 (TAC, 2003, pg 4).   
 
In September 1999 just before the protest in Seattle in 1999, the GSM redirected their 
sights on the United States Trade Representative (USTR).  The Treatment Action 
Campaign and the GSM accused the USTR which was acting on behalf of the 
pharmaceutical companies of greed.  The protestors stormed the office of the chief 
negotiator at the United States Trade Representative, Charlene Barshefsky, and several of 
them handcuffed themselves to the building‘s balcony.  They organised a steady stream 
of protest marches outside USTR‘s office, with oversized, twenty-foot puppets 
(Behrman, 2004, pg157).  The protests against the pharmaceutical companies started soon 
after Al Gore declared his candidacy.  Al Gore was targeted because activists had become 
convinced that the Gore camp was in the pharmaceutical industry‘s purse.  Following a 
wave of protests around the issue of accessibility and the embarrassment which came 
with them, the USTR released a press statement announcing an agreement with South 
Africa over drug issue.  The USTR would formally endorse the South African Medicines 
Act in return for South Africa‘s affirmation that it would adhere to all formal 
international agreements going forward, including Trade Related Intellectual Property 
rights (TRIP). 
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The GSM placed pressure on pharmaceutical companies to drop the lawsuit and because 
their head offices are abroad the pharmaceutical companies feared being portrayed as 
unsympathetic to the poor (Mottair and Friedman, 2006, pg35).  They withdrew the 
lawsuit.  The court action by the U.S. based pharmaceutical companies against the South 
African government‘s amendment of the Medicines and Related Substances Act of 1997 
is one of the factors which triggered the emergence of the TAC.  The amendment 
‗enabled the Department of Health to acquire generic versions of badly needed drugs at 
much lower prices than the big drug companies that had developed them were charging‘ 
(Sparks, pg 292). It encourages pharmacists to offer patients generic substitutes of the 
drug they have been prescribed.  It establishes a national pricing committee to evaluate 
the prices charged by drug companies.  It enables the government to introduce 
compulsory licensing of essential medicines to allow them to be manufactured locally.   
Compulsory licensing is a method to override existing intellectual property protection by 
compelling the holder of a patent to grant licenses to local manufacturers who will in turn 
charge lower prices. Compulsory licensing would allow South Africa to manufacture its 
own AIDS drugs and to distribute them within South Africa at affordable prices.  It 
provides for parallel importation, which means that drugs are bought from the country 
where they are available at the lowest price.  Parallel importation is the importation of 
pharmaceuticals from third parties not authorized by the patent-holding companies.  It 
allows South Africa to import a drug manufactured and sold at a lower cost elsewhere. In 
turn, the government is able to fulfill the supply that cannot be met under current pricing 
schemes. For example, if the South African government were to purchase Fluconazole 
(Diflucan) from the patent-holding pharmaceutical company it would cost approximately 
$4.10 per dose.  On the other hand, the South African government could purchase the 
same drug from generic drug manufacturers in Thailand for $0.60 per dose (Mombach, 
2001, pg290).   
 
South Africa is signatory to a Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIP) 
supervised by the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  TRIP embodies an effort to 
harmonize globally the intellectual property systems of WTO Member States. Some 
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critics argue that, because TRIP provides for worldwide patent protection, drugs become 
more expensive in developing countries.  TRIP requires protection of pharmaceutical 
products as well as processes. It contains several provisions available to all member 
states, which developing countries may utilize in order to obtain less expensive drugs.  
On the issue of compulsory licensing TRIP allows member countries to participate in 
compulsory licensing only if the proposed user makes reasonable efforts to obtain 
authorization from the right holder of the patent. The proposed user must satisfy several 
other conditions, including providing guarantees that the authorization will only be used 
to supply the country's domestic market (Mombach, 2001, pg276).  Regarding allowing 
the parallel imports TRIP allows member states to engage in parallel importation 
provided that they (the holders of rights) decide from which country to import.  Secondly 
should that country, from which imports are made, run out of supply they (the holders of 
rights) assume supply.  The U.S backed pharmaceutical companies were willing to allow 
the parallel trade ‗provided that the U.S reserve the right to approve of those 
trades‘(Behrman, 2004, pg 147).   
 
Although the struggle against the pharmaceutical companies in the case of the Medicines 
and Related Substances Control Act of 1997 was initiated by international activists, the 
TAC played a crucial role in those protests. The protest mounted in the US putting 
pressure of vice president Gore who was standing for the election to be the president of 
the United States to pressure the pharmaceutical companies to drop their lawsuit against 
the South African government.   
 
After the death of the AIDS activist, Christopher Moraka, in July 2000 TAC launched a 
defiance campaign against pharmaceutical companies.  Chistopher Moraka died after 
suffering from severe thrush because of the unavailability of the drug Fluconazole on the 
public health system because it was too expensive.  Fluconazole is used to treat fungal 
infections, including yeast infections of the vagina, mouth, throat, esophagus, abdomen , 
lungs, blood, and other organs. Fluconazole is also used to treat meningitis caused by 
fungus.  In 2004 a defiance campaign against leading company Pfizer was undertaken 
calling for it to reduce the prices of Fluconazole drug or relax its patent rights so that 
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generics can be manufactured.  Zackie Achmat visited Thailand where he bought 5 000 
capsules of a generic Fluconazole, with the trade name Biozole, for R1.78 each. He 
returned to South Africa with 3 000 tablets and passed through customs without being 
stopped.  Pfizer the company that had the intellectual property rights to the drug was 
distributing it in South Africa at the cost of R30 to the state and R80 to private 
individuals while the generic equivalent cost just under R2.00 in Thailand.  After this 
incident, which brought embarrassment to Pfizer, the company began to distribute the 
drug free of charge in state clinics in March 2001.  TAC had made the point.  In October 
2000 Zackie Achmat was ordered to present the illegal drugs to the Narcotics Bureau 
division of the South African Police Services in Cape Town.  On 20 October, flanked by 
political and religious leaders, Zackie Achmat surrendered himself to policed in Cape 
Town (Bardowitz, 2001) 
 
The rejection of Virodene as an African miracle to cue HIV/AIDS and the subsequent 
lawsuit by the pharmaceutical companies in opposition to the amendment of Medicines 
and Related Substances Control Act of 1997, made Thabo Mbeki very angry.  
Unfortunately this anger blinded him in his future engagement with the disease.  Sparks 
argues that it was while Thabo Mbeki was in his angry state of mind that he embraced the 
dissident‘s views on HIV/AIDS.  What further compounded the situation was the debate 
that followed regarding his dissident‘s argument on HIV/AIDS.  Failing to convert public 
opinion Mbeki announced that he was withdrawing from the debate.  Mbeki‘s stance of 
AIDS cost him dearly politically.  Mbeki‘s approval ratings declined steeply soon after 
the AIDS saga began and he has been struggling to regain the same level of political 
confidence from the public.  In May 2000, 71% of South Africans thought he was doing a 
good job, by June that had dropped to 66% and by August it was down to 50.2%.  A poll 
of urban adults of all races in early 2002 indicated that nearly 60% disagreed with his 
viewpoint on AIDS, and only one in 10 agreed fully with him (Sparks, 2003, pg 267).   
 
Finally, the partnership between the Treatment Action Campaign and the South African 
government would have yielded positive results in the fight against AIDS/HIV.  Where 
the government encountered restrictions due to its commitment to international treaties, 
 44 
the Treatment Action Campaign working with activists from the GSM would have made 
a difference.  However what has happened is that the government has refused to facilitate 
the TAC‘s campaign, and continues to frustrate the TAC in various ways.  In its attempt 
to deny the TAC victory notwithstanding that the United States dropped its opposition to 
the South African Medicines Act, and some pharmaceutical companies had agreed to 
drop their prices by 90% or more, by the year 2000, ‗the South African government still 
refused to help its people with the life saving drugs, as neighboring Botswana had begun 
to do‘ (Behrman, 2004, pg205).  Furthermore, to settle old scores, the South African 
government continues to discredit AZT drug and other antiretroviral drugs not 
withstanding the scientific findings in favor of the drugs. 
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Chapter 5 The emergence of the Landless People’s Movement 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the very first pieces of legislation that the new South African government in 1994 
promulgated was the Restitution Act No 22 of 1994. The main aim of this Act is to 
provide for the restitution of land rights to persons or communities dispossessed after 19 
June 1913 as a result of past racial discriminatory laws or practices (CRLR, 2003, pg 1).  
However the use of 1913 as the benchmark for restitution claims would not entirely 
address the question of land disposition because there are many instances whereby 
African people were dispossessed of their land prior to 1913.  The process of land seizure 
by the white settlers has been going on since Jan van Riebeeck set foot on the shores of 
the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 (Mbeki, 2003).  Between 1652 and 1913 there was a 
sustained campaign of African land dispossession.  During the Wars of Dispossession 
which lasted until around about 1880 a massive amount of African land fell into the 
hands of the White settlers.  Within few years after the discovery of diamonds in the 
1860s the British imperial government embarked on a policy of expansion in southern 
Africa.  British and colonial troops engaged in wars against a number of chiefdoms and 
overpowered one after the other in quick succession: the Hlubi in 1873; Gcaleka and Pedi 
in 1877; Ngqika, Thembu, Mpondo, Griqua and Barolong in 1878; Zulu in 1879; Sotho 
in 1880; and Ndebele in 1893 (Mbeki, 1990, pg1).  By the time the Wars of 
Dispossession ended, Africans had been pushed back to the areas which were known as 
the Native reserves at the formation of Union in 1910.  The Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 
‗reserved almost 14 percent of the land for Africans, who constituted 70% of the 
population‘ (Lipton, 1986, pg18).  Today despite years of 'land reform, 85% of the 
country remains under white ownership‘(Ann Everett, Interview, 2005).  Furthermore the 
Native Land Act ‗converted many African farmers into laborers, migrating to white areas 
to work‘ (Lipton, 1986, pg104).  The Native Land Act was intended to destroy economic 
independence of African farmers by claiming African property in white areas.  
Furthermore it created serious tenure insecurities in the land African communities 
consequently entrenching oppression and submissiveness.  Frightened of being kicked 
out from their homes in white owned farms, African peasant who remained squatting in 
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the white areas after the promulgation of the Native Land Act in 1913 were converted to 
slaves. 
 
It is not surprising therefore that amongst the first laws passed in South Africa was the 
Restitution Act No 22 of 1994.  Nelson Mandela understood that South Africa could 
never fully reconcile unless the question of land was addressed.  However unlike 
Zimbabwe, whose initial land reform model was influenced and backed by the Lancaster 
House Agreement of 1980 thus avoiding investor skepticism, South Africa lacked 
credible sponsor for its land reform program.  Consequently South Africa had to undergo 
painful lengths in order to devise a program that was going to maintain investors‘ 
confidence.  Most importantly for Nelson Mandela also was that the land reform program 
to be adopted needed to encourage reconciliation in South Africa.  Xeswi argues that the 
land reform program was ‗sabotaged before it began by the infamous Convention on a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) compromise in which it was agreed that the poor 
must buy back their own land‘ (Xeswi, 2005, pg178).  Since the early 1990‘s the World 
Bank has indeed advocated what it calls market-assisted land reform in countries around 
the world, and was a key influence on the thinking of the ANC during the transition in 
democracy (Lahiff, 2005, pg1).  The willing buyer willing seller is a concept under which 
the price paid for expropriated property is determined by reference to the price that would 
be paid for the property were it to be exchanged between a willing seller and a willing 
buyer.  Notwithstanding favorable conditions provided by this model to the landowners, 
most remain resistant to it.  This has as a result infuriated the land civic society 
organisations who accuse the government of not taken the land issue seriously and of 
dragging its feet on the issue of land reform.   
 
5.2 South African Land reform program 
The South African Commission on Restitution of Land Rights was created in 1995 to 
Provide equitable redress and restoration to victims of these dispossessions; particularly 
the landless and rural poor.  Contribute towards equitable redistribution of land in South 
Africa.  Promote reconciliation through the restitution process.  Facilitate development 
initiatives by bringing together all relevant stakeholders, especially the Provincial 
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Government and Municipalities.  It has proved a complex and slow-moving process, and 
nearly a decade after the first democratic elections, the government has found itself 
defending its record on delivery. 
 
5..2.1 Land restitution 
It is estimated that 3,5 million people were forcibly removed in the post World War II 
period in a further drive in the process of land dispossession.  The Native Land Act 
created a dependency syndrome amongst the Africans and more importantly created a 
pool of cheap labour for the white capitalists.  Lipton argues that ‗the demand of white 
farmers for cheap labour provided an additional (some would say) the major reason for 
the suppression of African agriculture‘ (Lipton, 1986, pg105).  The government created 
the Land Claims Court and Commission, established under the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act, 22 of 1994 to deal specifically with land restitution claims.  The process involves 
lodgment and registration, screening and categorisation, determination of qualifications 
in terms of section 2 of the Restitution Act, preparation for negotiations with the 
landowners and implementation/settlement of the claim.  To avoid an open ended land 
claims process the government controversially declared 31 December 1998 as the 
deadline for all restitution claims.  The South African government has settled to date 
claims in excess of 36,488 (CRLR,2003, pg2). 
 
5.2.2 Land tenure amendment 
Land Tenure reform was designed to address present land policy, administration and 
legislation to improve the tenure security of all South Africans and to accommodate 
diverse forms of land tenure, including types of communal tenure (ownership).  The 
tenure insecurities remain the greatest form of oppression and injustice carried out by the 
landowners, both government and private.  The tenure insecurity in non-government land 
is often accompanied by various challenges for the landless.  One major challenge is 
government‘s unwillingness to invest in socioeconomic development.  The argument 
brought forward by government is that because the land is in private hands who reserve 
full rights of the land, it will be foolhardy to invest state resources in such a situation.  
People who are mostly affected landless by tenure insecurity in private land are those 
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who live in informal settlements in urban areas and farm workers and their dependents in 
the farms.  In 1997 the government introduced the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 
no.92.  The purpose of the Act is to provide for measures with State assistance to 
facilitate long-term security of land tenure; to regulate the conditions of residence on 
certain land; to regulate the conditions on and circumstances under which the right of 
persons to reside on land may be terminated; and to regulate the conditions and 
circumstances under which persons, whose right of residence has been terminated, may 
be evicted from land; and to provide for matters connected therewith (Government 
Gazette, 1997, pg1).  However arbitrary evictions continue to occur in South Africa 
despite the promulgation of legislation such as the Extension of Security of Tenure Act.  
This is a result of combination of reasons.  Human Rights commission agues that ‗the 
implementation of legislation has been weak resulting in enforcement mechanisms failing 
to provide the necessary protection and the lack of institutional and financial support to 
implement the legislation results in systems that are shielded from external observation‘ 
(SAHRC, 2004, pg5).  In addressing the concerns of the landless in government owned 
land, the government introduced the Communal Land Rights Act no. 11 in 2004.  The 
purpose of the Act is to give secure land tenure rights to communities and persons who 
occupy and use land that the previous government had reserved for occupation by the 
African people.  Most of this land is registered in the name of the State or is held in trust 
by the Minister of Land Affairs or the Ingonyama Trust for communities.   
 
5.2.3 Land redistribution 
Since 1994, only 2% of land has been distributed falling far short of the 30% that was 
targeted for by government by 2012. The two main reasons identified by the SAHRC for 
this failure in this area is the lack of land available for redistribution and the lack of 
adequate and integrated support services to beneficiaries of land redistribution 
programmes (SAHRC, 2004, pg3).  The government‘s aim of land redistribution is to 
provide the disadvantaged and the poor with access to land for residential and productive 
purposes. Its scope includes the urban and rural very poor, labour tenants, farm workers 
as well as new entrants to agriculture (87:13% the White: Black land ownership ratio) 
(CRLR, 2003, pg 1).  These by and large are people who cannot afford land due 
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economic constrains and historical disempowerment.  Their inability to acquire land is 
further exacerbated by ‗the marketisation of social services, where potential citizens 
entitled to social services are transformed into customers who have to pay for these 
services‘ (Greenberg, 2006, pg 133) disenabling them to save enough money to purchase 
land.  There is a scarcity of viable commercial agricultural land in South Africa. There is 
only a small fraction of commercial agricultural land in the possession of the State.  
Present landowners of commercial agricultural land do not willingly sell their land. In 
some instances there is a tendency by these landowners to overprice their land.  Land in 
South Africa is expensive and buyers including the State cannot afford to purchase land 
(SAHRC, 2004, pg3).  Unlike in the urban areas of South Africa where the biggest 
challenge for the landless is tenure insecurity and houses.  In rural South Africa the 
acquisition of land is important because of subsistence farming which is central to rural 
societies and economies.  In many developing countries and some formerly communist 
societies, rural families comprise a substantial majority of the population. For these 
families, land represents a fundamental asset: it is a primary source of income, security, 
and status (McKinley, 2004, pg1) 
 
5.3 The emergence of the Landless People’s Movement in South Africa 
The envisaged passive reconstructionist role by the players in the civil society has failed 
to materialise.  The majority of the new social movements have instead adopted 
confrontational reconstructionist model towards reconstruction and development.  The 
gap between the promises of 1994 and the failure apparent by 1999 quickly began to test 
the patience of the landless people, who in turn began to put pressure on the Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) who had helped to convince them to wait for the 
land reform policy to work, despite its obvious flaws (Xeswi, 2005, pg184).  The World 
Conference on Racism, Discrimination and Xenophobia and later the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development provided platforms during which the landless movement was 
launched.  The Landless People‘s Movement (LPM) drew inspiration from the rising tide 
of international struggles against globalisation and neo-liberalism, especially after the 
Seattle protests of 1999 and particularly the rapid rise of the peasant struggles, such as the 
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highly successful Movimento does Trabalharados Rerais Sem Terra (MST) in Brazil and 
their growing linkages internationally through La Via Campesina.   
 
Greenberg argues that the Landless people‘s Movement was formed around two different 
types of grassroots mobilisation.  On the one hand, there were groups organised through 
the NGO‘s to participate in government land reform programmes.  On the other hand, the 
other type of mobilisation which formed the base of the Landless People‘s Movement is 
spontaneous organisation to resist encroachment on the existing land access (Greenberg, 
2006, pg 136).  The government has put in place platforms to ensure that confrontations 
between the players in the civil society were avoided i.e. the support of the National Land 
Commission to deal with the issues of land and mobilizing the community around the 
issues of land.  Tensioned soon simmered between the ANC aligned activists and the 
leftists who argued that the complications on the questions of land are the creation of the 
government‘s economic policies and its adopted strategies in addressing the land question 
and the slow pace of delivery.  The tensions escalated further when the LPM ‗warned that 
unless land reform was speeded up, it would launch a campaign to take the land back‘ 
(Gumede, 2005, pg 280).   
 
‗We calculate that it would take at least 120 years to redistribute the 30% at the current 
pace. And note that I am only talking about 30%. We believe it could take up to 400 
years to have a substantial land reform in SA. It‘s basically an unworkable situation‘ 
(Jacobs, 2003, pg1).  The Landless People‘s Movement was formed as a result of this 
deep rooted frustration over the slow pace of land and agricultural reform and restitution.  
They blame the adoption of the World Bank‘s Willing Buyer Willing Seller land reform 
model by the South African government for this delay.  Willing Buyer Willing Seller 
model posits that ‗the price paid for expropriated property must be determined by 
reference to the price that would be paid for the property were it to be exchanged between 
a willing seller and a willing buyer‘ (Lahiff, 2005, pg 1).  The greatest challenge to the 
landless presented by this model is that most landowners have often resorted to racist 
methods which prevent the willing buyers from acquiring the land.  The white owners of 
land have in instances refused to sell the land to black potential buyers for variety of 
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reasons.  The Transvaal Agricultural Union (white farmers) established a Restitution 
Resistance Fund with the main purpose of opposing land claims. In cases where they 
realized that the claimants had valid claims they lobby or do everything possible to 
influence the claimants to get financial compensation so that they are paid off the land. In 
many cases they are hostile to claimants (CRLR, 2003, pg5).  The South African 
government seemed oblivious to the fact that South Africa‘s historical past could be an 
obstacle in the implementation of the land reform program i.e. ‗landowners can actively 
avoid offering their land for sale for land reform purposes, say on racist grounds, and still 
dispose of their land on the open market‘ (Lahiff, 2005, pg1).  Furthermore what 
complicates the situation even more is that the South African land reform model remains 
silent on many important facilitating factors and the government remains less engaged in 
the process.  The Zimbabwean land reform program, before it deteriorated into the 
current form, was driven by the government.  The government‘s involvement helped fast 
track the reform and also dealt with the challenges of resistance from the landowners.  
Furthermore the land reform model in Zimbabwe granted the government (the buyer) the 
right of first refusal on all land sales without obligation to purchase meaning that the 
government had access to more land for land reform.   
 
In South Africa ‗the state does not have the power of first refusal and the intended 
beneficiaries have to compete for available land on the open market, at a market price‘ 
(Lahiff, 2005, pg1).  The landowners in South Africa effectively have ‗a veto over land 
reform‘ argues Lahiff.  Chapter 7 Section 25 under Property in the South African 
constitution provides for the government to expropriate land where land is not made 
available.  South Africa has been very reluctant in going that route but has contemplated 
introducing Land Tax.  The proponents of this form of land reform argue that Land Tax if 
applied properly can put pressure on the land owners to release unused land.  The land 
prices have also remained one of the most precluding factors in the South African land 
reform.  The Land Summit made recommendations that the compensation for land should 
take into consideration the following: the current use of the property, the history of the 
acquisition and use of the property, the market value of the property, the extent of direct 
state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the 
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property.  However Lahiff argues that this formula of calculation was most likely to 
considerably reduce the land price below what is currently paid.  He suggests that the 
government considers what most commercial banks use to calculate the collateral values 
of farms internationally i.e. Productive Value.  Productive value is based on the estimated 
productivity of the land when used for agricultural purposes, and is typically below the 
prevailing market price.    
 
Furthermore the Landless People‘s Movement has risen in a ‗context of the negative 
effects of years of belt tightening fiscal policies on the poor and the marginalized 
majority of the country, following the adoption of neo-liberal Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic strategy in 1996‘ (Greenberg, 2006, pg132).  
South Africa negotiated a free trade deal that included other SADC countries with the 
Europeans Union.  It was both controversial and not entirely successful, as the southern 
African markets were suddenly flooded with cheap, highly subsidized EU products, and 
many local industries went under (Gumede, 2005, pg198).   Furthermore the uncontrolled 
South African land grabbing by the foreign and national rich people has raised the price 
of land in South Africa dramatically. The purchase of land by foreigners needs to be 
investigated in order to determine whether this has contributed to the boom in property 
prices (SAHRC, 2004, pg7).  The social consequences of GEAR have been very drastic 
for the popular sectors: increased unemployment, rising from 16% in 1990 to more than 
40% in recent years; an increase in poverty, with the official rate at 70% and of extreme 
poverty, estimated at 28 (McKinley, 2004, pg1).  This coupled with the marketisation of 
social services, where potential citizens entitled to social services are transformed into 
customers who have to pay for services (Greenberg,2006, pg133) make it difficult for 
landless to save enough money to access land.  Funds which would have ordinarily gone 
towards the purchasing of land are used to pay for basic services and for those affected by 
HIV/AIDS, to purchasing expensive drugs.  The escalation in the price of basic services 
like water and electricity and the unavailability of health facilities continues to present 
challenges for the landless.   
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Many argue that South Africa‘s over zealousness in pleasing the potential investors 
continue to hurt the poor.  The Willing Seller Willing Buyer land reform model has 
presented more problems to the landless whilst it unfairly enriches the landowners.  Land 
prices suddenly escalated to unrecorded price levels in order to exploit the government 
and prevent black people from owning land.  In the rural areas the lack of land has forced 
many people to migrate to the urban areas which lead to a string of social disturbances.  
The large influx of the poor from the rural to urban continues to overburden the urban 
social structures.  The emergence of the Landless People‘s Movement is significant in the 
struggle towards land reformation and has prioritized the landless question.  However the 
fact that this movement is led by people who are unaffected by landlessness undermines 
the movement.  Except for provincial leadership, most members of the national 
leadership of LPM live in Johannesburg suburbs.  This therefore justifies accusations 
labeled at the NSMs including the Landless People‘s Movement that they are vehicles for 
disgruntled academics and last hitch for those former anti apartheid activists who missed 
the 1994 gravy train.  It is not entirely true that the activists are disgruntled academics 
and activists.  Some of these comrades are genuine South Africans driven by principle 
(Vally, Interview).  The multi agenda of the LPM which promotes both social and 
capitalist struggles ‗Labour tenants, farm workers, residents of informal settlements and 
rural towns, restitution claimants and small-scale commercial farmers are represented on 
the national structure‘ (Greenberg, 2006, pg 140) has affected the movement‘s agenda.  
Furthermore the incoherent strategy, conflict of personalities within the LPM leadership 
has crippled the organisation.  LPM remain without an office and Andile Mngxitama and 
Anne Everitt who performed variety of LPM‘s executive work are employed separately 
elsewhere.   
 
Jean-Paul Sartre describes the process through which a group of atomized individuals 
form a collective with a common purpose, but this usually disintegrates or becomes 
ossified once the immediate purpose has been achieved.  The government has over the 
years has introduced laws which seek to address most questions raised by the LPM and it 
continues to improve the land reform program.  This has as a consequence left LPM 
issueless.  Consequently many members of the Landless People‘s Movement particularly 
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in urban areas are joining en masse the Homeless Peoples Alliance.  Furthermore the 
willing buyer wiling seller land reform model has indeed further presented the landless 
people from accessing land.  The market related price suggested by this model is often 
exhaustive and prevents many from accessing land  
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
SANCO could not be player and a referee at the same time.  Gumede argues that ‗the real 
rot set in when SANCO pledged its support to the ANC in the first democratic election 
without securing a formal mechanism that would give it a say in decision-making at a 
local government level‘ (Gumede, 2005, pg 275).  The role of the civic organisations 
remained indispensable particularly in the poor communities even after 1994.  Therefore 
the political cooption of SANCO within the ANC left a huge political vacuum in the 
society.  The biggest blow to SANCO however came in 1995 when South Africa held its 
first local municipal elections.  To avoid the possible conflict within the political 
authorities especially in wards where the civics were strong, SANCO entered into an 
alliance with the ANC.  This marriage was doomed from the beginning however the last 
straw came in 1996 when the ruling ANC adopted GEAR as the new macroeconomic 
policy of South Africa.  In 1999 after the election of Thabo Mbeki there was a sporadic 
emergence of the NSMs. 
 
The ANC came to power with a neo-Keynesian program, the Reconstruction and 
Development Program (RDP), whose initial implementation was very partial, but which 
was abandoned two years in favor of the Growth Employment and Redistribution 
Strategy (GEAR), a program of neo-liberal aspect (Antentas, 2006, pg1).  In January 
1990 a month before he was released from prison, Nelson Mandela issued a press 
statement in which he declared ‗the nationalization of the mines, the financial institutions 
and monopoly industry is the fundamental policy of the ANC and it is inconceivable that 
we will ever change this policy‘ (Sparks, 2003, pg 170).  This was in line with the 
Freedom Charter of the ANC which states that ‗the mineral wealth beneath the soil, the 
banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a 
whole‘.  The shift of the ANC from Redistribution and Development Program to the 
adoption of GEAR (Growth Employment and Redistribution), a home grown structural 
adjustment program ‗that sought to balance social development, the demands of joining a 
highly competitive global market and the often conflicting stakeholder interests of the 
ANC‘s supporters‘ (Friedman 2001, pg47) and the inability to deliver basic services has 
invited protests from various spheres of the society as already stated.  GEAR was 
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undoubtedly the effort by the South African government to streamline South African 
economics to international neo-liberalism.  Desai argues that South Africa is under real 
pressure from international financial markets to introduce austerity policies.  However it 
has cooperated with an unseemly enthusiasm in pursuing that.  For instance, when the 
WTO gave South African government twelve years to phase out protections of its 
national garment industry, the ANC chose to complete the project in eight years (Desai, 
2004).   
 
The relaxation of economic protection programs and the coercion to implement SAP 
(Structural Adjustment Programs) by the IMF, World Bank and other financial 
international institution means that the small economies, especially in the developing 
world, are flooded with cheap subsidized products from developed economies.  This 
eventually led to closure of industries manufacturing similar goods that consequently led 
to retrenchments and unemployment.  This has been the case in the textile industry 
especially in the Western Cape. According to the general secretary of the South African 
Clothing and Textile Workers Union Ebrahim Patel, more than a thousand jobs were still 
being lost every month in the clothing, textile, and the leather industries in the first six 
months of 2003 (Desai, 2004, pg1).  Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) have criticized GEAR.  
However COSATU as its president Willie Madisha acknowledges ‗ COSATU has been 
weak since the unveiling of GEAR in 1996 only recently did it start opening its eyes‘ 
(Buhlungu, 2006, pg69).   
 
The local implementation of GEAR resulted into Egoli 2002, a Structural Adjustment 
Program which proposed the privatization of water and other basic services.  Egoli 2002 
invited protests from the poor communities of Soweto who were amongst the first 
municipality to have their basic services privatised.  SANCO was inundated with 
complaints from the community and was accused of betraying their political mandate.  
The affected communities of Soweto regarded SANCO/ANC led local authorities, 
complicit in their plight because they were charged with driving the implementation of 
Egoli 2002.  During this time SANCO found itself at the horns of dilemma.  Their 
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constituency was unhappy with GEAR and expected their leaders to change the situation.  
However ANC was in charge, not SANCO.  SANCO‘s leaders who accepted positions in 
the ANC, whether or not they maintained their positions in SANCO, could not effectively 
represent SANCO‘s interests when they were against those of the ANC or the 
government (Zuern, 2006, pg185).   
 
Thabo Mbeki‘s anger directed to the pharmaceutical companies impaired his judgment 
and created tension between the government and the TAC.  What started as an effective 
partnership between the TAC and the government against the challenges of HIV/AIDS 
has culminated to undesirable end.  TAC took the government to court for failing to 
provide antiretroviral drugs to the HIV/AIDS patients and won.  The key change in the 
political opportunity structure is democraticisation since 1994.  This created opportunities 
for influence, such as the use of the constitutional court (Friedman and Mottair, 2006, 
pg24).  This recognition impacts on the mobilisation strategy and legitimization of social 
struggles post 1994.  ‗The legitimacy of the government and popularity of the ruling 
party are new realities that activists forget at their peril‘ (Friedman and Mottair, 2006, 
pg25).  The point made here is that the ruling ANC is still seen by many South Africans 
as a legitimate organisation led by democratically elected leaders.  It would be foolhardy 
therefore for anyone to challenge that legitimacy and try to compete with that in an old 
like manner.  TAC realized that soon in their history and they have as a consequence 
utilized the democratic platforms like the courts to achieve their agenda.  The TAC has 
created citizens and has enable 180 000 people to receive treatment today in South Africa 
(Zackie Achmat, 2006,  interview).   
 
The end of apartheid presented South Africa with a host of events aimed at welcoming 
South Africa back into the international community.  After the elections of 1994 South 
Africa hosted three major sporting events, the Africa Cup of Nations, the Rugby World 
Cup and the International Cricket World Cup.  In 2001 and in 2003 South Africa was 
asked to host two United Nations Conferences, i.e. the World Conference against Racism, 
Discrimination and Xenophobia and World Summit on Sustainable Development.  Both 
of these conferences had a profound impact on the South African NSMs.  The first 
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conference in 2001 was held in Durban International Convention Centre.  South Africa 
was an appropriate host of this event after it managed to defeated the worst racism of its 
kind under apartheid.  It was during this gathering that the rejuvenation of social activism 
occurred and the Landless People‘s Movement was launched.  The conference was 
divided into two parts, the governmental meeting and the civil society gathering.  The 
Durban Social Forum was tasked to coordinate the civil society gathering which managed 
to organize the largest civil society march in South Africa post 1994.  The march 
reflected a plethora of international struggles, there were Dalits from India and Japan, 
scores of Palestinian activists, landless movements from Latin Americas and various new 
social movements from South Africa.  They were all united in their condemnation of 
globalization and neo-liberalism included were few ANC marchers who seemed unaware 
of the attack leveled against their ruling party.  They only objected when insulting 
slogans were leveled to Thabo Mbeki.   
 
In 2003 two years after the Durban Conference South Africa hosted the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development.  The ANC did not want to see the repeat of the events 
which occurred during the WCAR, where the anti neo-liberalists and the anti globalists 
Left of South Africa influenced the outcome of the conference.  They made sure that they 
were involved in the entire process in organising the summit.  Unlike in 2001 during the 
WCAR in Durban, they attended all meetings and used their connections to ensure that 
right people held influenctial positions in the coordinating team of the summit.  South 
African Non Governmental Coalition (SANGOCO) coordinated the civil society 
gatherings this time around in Johannesburg.   
 
The over imposition of the ANC in the coalition led to the isolation of the NSMs most of 
them preferring to have outside of the conference meetings with the participating global 
activists, meetings later dubbed ‗Pavement Conferences‘.  The last day of the conference 
was reserved for the joint march by all participating organizations in the civil society 
sector.  Because of the division between the ANC and the NSMs, two civil society 
marches were organized, one led by the NSMs and the other by the ANC.  The New 
Social Movement march which started from Alexandra Township to Sandton, where the 
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summit was held, drew larger crowd leaving the ANC very embarrassed after it only 
managed to attract a very small number of people.  After the summit the ANC led 
government started purging certain people from its corporatists Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO).  Ballard, et al, argue that the corporatist NGO‘s are those 
organisations established immediate post-apartheid phase and were subcontracted by 
government to undertake development services thereby entrenching the collegiate logic 
of state-civil society relations.  The first and the most popular casualty of the purge was 
Zakes Hlatshwayo chairperson of the National Land Committee (NLC).  Hlatswayo was 
fired from his position after failing to call Andile Mngxitama of the Landless People‘s 
Organisation to order after he, Mngxitama, called for land invasions.  National Land 
Committee was a major financial sponsor of the Landless People‘s Movement and it 
helped and it helped formed the LPM.  Furthermore Khanya College was kicked out of its 
premises in Newtown Johannesburg.  These premises are owned by the Johannesburg 
Municipality and were used by most NSM for meetings. 
 
There can be no doubt that globalization and neo-liberalism influenced the emergence of 
the New Social Movements in South Africa.  The high cost of indispensable drugs for 
those affected and infected by HIV/AIDS is a result of South Africa‘s global 
commitments.  The struggle for land in this country is against global dictates of the 
World Bank‘s Willing Buyer Willing Seller land reform model.  Intellectual Property 
Rights and the Willing Buyer Willing Seller are both neo-liberal global constructs.  
However the adoption of certain forms of protests and discourse failed the movements.  
Most of the NSMs formed after 1999, except for the Treatment Action Campaign, 
utilized same anti apartheid forms of protests i.e.  marches, toyi-toyi and demonstrations 
against the legitimate ANC.  These forms of protest which were used against the 
apartheid government less than 10 years ago did not resonate appropriately within the 
rank and file South Africans when used against the ANC.  Challenging the ANC is a 
risky business.  Except for Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, most who tried to 
challenge the ANC have ended up in political periphery.  Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC) understood this, hence its many victories over the years.  Many argue that its use 
of courts and lawyering shows ‗patriotism‘ and acceptance of the new democratic order.  
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Furthermore the ad hoc alliance on certain campaigns between the TAC and the member 
of the tripartite alliance and the constant reminder by Zackie Achmad the national 
chairperson of TAC of his ‗ANCness‘ has afforded the TAC many gains and huge 
support from the grassroots 
 
Many NSMs attacked the ANC instead of attacking GEAR, one of the many policies that 
the ANC have adopted over the years.  Some like the SECC even went to an extent of 
forming a political party to challenge the ANC at the polls.  The ANC is a very diverse 
organisation.  David Makhura, the provincial secretary of ANC in Gauteng argues ‗it is 
made up of people with divergent views and opinions‘.  Indeed these differences were 
demonstrated at the National Governing Council (NGC) meeting of the ANC in 2005 
were the rank and file members of the ANC managed to change a very important decision 
which was taken by the National Executive Committee (NEC) to expel the deputy 
president Jacob Zuma from his position as the deputy president of the organisation after 
he was implicated in the trial of the convicted fraudster Schabier Sheik.  Furthermore the 
National Policy Conference of the ANC which took place in Johannesburg in June 2007 
also demonstrated the variety of political trajectories within the ANC.  The party was 
divided on the issue of whether the president of the ANC should be the president of the 
country, avoiding the two tier of power as the ANCYL puts it.   
 
Finally, this report interviewed several leaders of the NSM‘s.  They all seem to be united 
in their condemnation of neo-liberal economics of the ANC.  The interviews did not add 
much value to the report because the interviewees simply confirmed what has already 
been published, the interviews merely served as the confirmation of the published reports. 
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